T78 


576 


CO 
CO 


GIFT   OF 
of. 


•'les   ~.    Kofo'i 


THE 


AND    THE 


FISHERIES; 


OR    THE 


DIPLOMATIC  TALENTS 


CANDIDLY  EXAMINED, 


Dup.  Union  Theol.  Sem. 

BOSTON; 
PRINTED  BY  J.  H.  A,  FHQST, 

Congress  street, 

1824. 


T73 


ein   rr 

CHARLES  A  KGFOID 


WHO  has  not  heard  of  the  triumphant  result  of  the 
negotiations  at  Ghent  ?  Who  does  not  know  that  the 
glory  of  the  triumph  is  claimed  by  John  Quincy  Adams  ? 
He  is  the  intellectual  giant  who  prostrated  with  ease 
the  sophistry,  and  the  arguments  ;  the  arts,  schemes  and 
stratagems  of  a  superannuated  Admiral  and  two  mere 
diplomatic  machines. 

It  may  be  questioned  whether  a  resistance  to  the 
British  claim  for  making  the  Penobscot  an  eastern  boun 
dary,  surrendering  Louisiana,  an  absolute  exclusion 
from  the  lakes,  and  precluding  ourselves  from  the  exer 
cise  of  all  authority  or  influence  over  the  Indians  with 
in  our  own  limits,  can  be  considered  as  absolute  evidence 
of  superior  diplomatic  skill  and  intellectual  power. 
Great  Britain  never  expected  from  us  an  acquiescence 
in  such  monstrous  demands,  and  one  would  think  that 
an  ordinary  mind  might  have  commanded  sufficient  ar 
guments  to  refute  such  pretensions  when  urged  on  the 
ground  of  right. 

Did  the  Commissioners  of  America  succeed  in  securing 
a  treaty  stipulation,  respecting  the  imprisonment  of 
seamen,  and  the  belligerent  right  to  blockade,  which, 
together  with  the  celebrated  orders  in  council,  were  the 
only  alleged  causes  of  the  war?  None  will  pretend 
that  they  did : — then  it  would  seem  that  the  whole 
skill  of  the  Commissioners  was  exerted  to  save  that 
which  was  unquestionably  ours  before  the  commence- 

M169387 


frient  of  hostilities,  and  not  to  obtain  reparation  for  vio 
lated  rights  and  a  permanent  security  for  their  future 
inviolability. 

Such  is  the  foundation  of  that  mighty  reputation 
which  has  been  reared  up  for  the  wise  men  of  Ghent. 

The  whole  commission  saved  the  Territory  of  the 
United  States,  excepting  Moose  Island,  an  integral  part 
of  old  Massachusetts ! 

They  saved  to  us  a  right  of  going  to  the  British  East 
Indies  with  solid  specie,  and  returning  with  Indian 
cottons,  to  compete  with  ours,  and  Indian  silks  to  clothe 
our  yeomanry. 

Whether  the  labour  of  preservation  was  divided  of 
not,  I  do  not  know  :  but  Mr.  Adams  claims  the  exclu 
sive  merit  of  SAVING  the  FISHERIES. 

For  this,  his  admirers  claim  for  him  a  reputation 
equal  to  that  of  Sully,  or  Richelieu,  or  the  Duke  of 
Marlborough. 

We  are  informed  in  Mr.  Adams'  pamphlet  contain 
ing  his  remarks  upon  the  private  letter  and  duplicate 
of  Mr.  Russell,  that  immediately  after  the  meeting  of 
the  Commissioners  at  Ghent,  the  British  Commissioners 
notified  the  American  delegation  "  that  the  British 
Government  did  not  intend  to  grant  to  the  United 
States  gratuitously,  the  privileges  formerly  granted  by 
Treaty  to  them,  of  fishing  within  the  limits  of  the 
British  sovereignty,  and  of  using  the  shores  of  the  Bri 
tish  territories,  for  the  purposes  connected  with  the 
fishery."  Shortly  after  he  says,  "the  only  way  in 
which  it  was  possible  to  meet  the  notification  of  the 
British  plenipotentiaries,  without  surrendering  the  rights 
which  it  jeopardized,  was  by  denying  the  principle 
upon  which  it  was  founded.  This  was  done,  by  assert 
ing  the  principle,  that  the  Treaty  of  Independence  of 
1783,  was  of  that  class  of  treaties,  and  the  right  in 
question  of  that  character,  which  are  not  abrogated  by 
a  subsequent  war ;  that  the  notification  of  the  intention 
of  the  British  government,  not  to  renew  the  grant) 
could  not  affect  the  right  of  the  United  States,  which 
had  not  been  forfeited  by  the  war ;  and  that  considering 


it  as  still  in  force,  the  United  States  needed  no  new 
grant  from  Great  Britain  to  revive,  or  any  new  article 
to  confirm  it." 

"  It  was  not  acceded  to  by  the  British  plenipoten 
tiaries.  Each  party  adhered  to  its  asserted  principle ; 
and  the  Treaty  was  concluded  without  settling  the  in 
terest  involved  in  it." 

The  principle,  that  the  title  to  the  fisheries  was  prior 
possession,  and  acknowledgment  by  the  Treaty  of 
1783,  and  that  Treaty,  was  not  and  could  not  from  its 
intrinsic  character  be  abrogated  by  a  subsequent  war, 
Mr.  Adams  says,  "  he  willingly  admits  to  have  been 
assumed  and  advanced  by  the  American  Commissioners, 
at  his  suggestion" 

The  proceedings  of  the  British  and  American  nations 
subsequent  to  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent, 
will  tend  to  elucidate  more  clearly,  the  subject  of  the 
Fisheries. 

The  provisions  of  that  Treaty  had  scarcely  become 
operative,  before  the  enrolment  and  license  of  a  fishing 
vessel  from  Cape  Cod,  was  endorsed  by  Captain  Lock, 
of  the  British  navy,  in  the  following  words,  "  Warned 
off  the  coast  by  his  Majesty's  sloop  Jaseur,  not  to  come 
within  sixty  miles,  N.  Lock,  Captain."  This  was  done 
on  the  19th  of  June,  1815.  The  American  vessel  re 
turned  home  without  completing  her  fare.  Information 
of  the  circumstance  was  immediately  communicated,  by 
the  collector  of  Barnstable,  to  the  American  govern 
ment.  Mr.  Monroe,  then  Secretary  of  State,  on  the 
18th  of  July,  addressed  a  note  to  Mr.  Baker,  the  Bri 
tish  Charge  d?  Affaires,  in  which  he  complained  of  this 
act,  and  also  of  « the  similar  warning  which  had  been 
given  by  the  commander  of  the  Jaseur,  to  all  the  other 
American  vessels,  which  were  then  in  sight." 

Mr.  Baker  in  his  reply,  denied  the  authority  of  the 
Captain  of  the  Jaseur,  to  warn  off  American  vessels, 
fishing  at  the  distance  of  60  miles  from  the  British  coasts, 
and  stated  explicitly,  that  the  British  government,  had 
never  authorized  any  interruption  to  American  vessels, 
fishing  on  the  high  seas. 


On  the  21st  of  July,  Mr.  Monroe  addressed  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Adams,  who  was  then  our  Minister  to  the  Court 
of  Great  Britain,  complaining  of  the  outrage  of  the 
Jaseur.  "This  (says  the  Secretary)  it  is  presumed 
has  been  done  under  a  construction  of  the  late  Treaty 
of  Peace,  which  by  being  silent  on  the  subject,  left 
that  important  interest  to  rest  on  the  ground,  on  which 
it  was  placed  by  the  Treaty  of  1783."  (Thus  assuming 
the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Adams.)  He  continues  "  the 
measure  thus  promptly  taken  by  the  British  govern 
ment,  notwithstanding  the  declaration  of  our  Ministers 
at  Ghent,  that  our  right  would  not  be  affected  by  the 
silence  of  the  Treaty,  indicates  a  spirit  which  excites 
equal  surprise  and  regret:  one  which  by  no  means 
corresponds  with  the  amicable  relations  established  be 
tween  the  two  countries  by  that  Treaty,  or  with  the 
spirit,  with  which  it  has  been  executed  by  the  United 
States."  He  further  says,  "  Every  right  appertaining 
to  the  fisheries  which  was  secured  by  the  Treaty  of 
1783,  stands  now  as  unshaken  and  perfect  as  it  then 
did,  constituting  a  vital  part  of  our  political  existence, 
and  resting  on  the  same  solid  foundation,  as  our 
Independence  itself"  He  proceeds,  "  it  can  scarcely 
be  presumed,  that  the  British  government,  after  the 
result  of  the  late  experiment,  in  the  present  state  of 
Europe,  and  under  its  other  engagements,  can  seri 
ously  contemplate  a  renewal  of  hostilities."  He  con 
cludes  with  saying,  that  "  ive  ought  to  be  prepared  at 
every  point  to  guard  against  such  an  event,"  and  ex 
horts  Mr.  Adams,  to  be  attentive  to  circumstances,  and 
to  give  timely  notice  of  threatened  danger. 

On  the  19th  of  September,  Mr.  Adams,  in  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Monroe,  after  expressing  an  apprehension  that  a 
disposition  existed,  on  the  part  of  the  British  government, 
to  renew  hostilities,  states  the  substance  of  a  conversation 
with  Lord  Bathurst.  Upon  inquiry  whether  he  had 
received  from  Mr.  Baker,  any  communication  respect 
ing  several  subjects  of  complaint  on  the  part  of  America, 
among  which  was  the  warning  given  by  the  Captain  of 
the  Jaseur,  to  the  American  fishing  vessels,  he  answer- 


ed,  that  a  communication  on  the  subject,  had  been 
already  sent  to  Mr.  Baker,  and  at  the  request  of  Mr. 
Adams,  he  stated  to  him  its  substance,  "  that  as  on  the 
one  hand,  Great  Britain  could  not  permit  the  vessels  of 
the  United  States  to  fish  within  the  creeks,  and  close 
upon  the  shores  of  the  British  territories,  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  was  by  no  means  her  intention  to  inter 
rupt  them,  in  fishing  any  where  in  the  open  sea,  or 
without  the  territorial  jurisdiction,  a  marine  league 
from  the  shore.  And,  therefore,  that  the  warning 
given  at  the  place  stated,  in  the  case  referred  to,  was 
altogether  unauthorized." 

Mr.  Adams  then  urged  upon  the  consideration  of 
the  British  Minister,  the  existence  of  an  absolute  right, 
on  the  part  of  America,  still  to  take  fish  in  the  British 
waters,  and  expressed  an  intention  of  addressing  a  letter 
to  him  on  the  subject. 

Lord  Bathurst,  replied,  that  due  attention  should  be 
given  to  the  letter,  but  that  Great  Britain  had  expli 
citly  manifested  her  intention  concerning  this  subject, 
that  it  had  excited  much  feeling,  and  that  the  British 
fishermen,  considered  it  as  an  excessive  hardship  to  be 
supplanted  by  the  Americans  upon  their  own  shores. 

Mr.  Adams  considered  this  feeling,  as  the  sensibility 
of  a  partial,  and  individual  interest,  which  mistook  a 
right  for  a  privilege.  If  an  attention  to  that  interest 
was  to  have  weight  in  determining  the  policy  of  the 
British  Cabinet,  there  was  another  interest  liable  to  be 
affected*  which  was  also  worthy  of  consideration  ;  the 
manufacturing  interest.  "  The  question  of  right  had 
not  been  discussed  at  the  negotiations  at  Ghent.  The 
British  plenipotentiaries,  had  given  a  notice  that  the 
British  government,  did  not  intend  hereafter,  to  grant 
to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  the  right  to  fish, 
and  to  cure  and  dry  fish,  within  the  exclusive  British 
jurisdiction  in  America,  without  an  equivalent,  as  it  had 
been  granted,  by  the  Treaty  of  1783.  The  American 
plenipotentiaries  had  given  notice,  in  return,  that  the 
American  government,  considered  all  the  rights  and 
liberties  in  and  to  the  fisheries,  on  the  coast  of  North 


8 

America,  as  sufficiently  secured  by  the  possession  of 
them,  which  had  always  been  enjoyed  by  them  previ 
ous  to  the  Revolution,  and  by  the  recognition  of  them, 
in  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  in  1783."  Mr,  Adams,  also 
contended,  for  the  non-abrogation  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace,  in  1783,  by  the  war  of  1812,  and  the  right  of 
fishing  as  being  co-equal  to,  and  co-existent  with  the 
right  to  independence,  and  that  it  could  not  be  surren 
dered,  without  a  virtual  surrender  of  independence,  &c. 

He  then  says,  "  There  were  also  considerations  of 
policy  and  expediency,  to  which  I  hoped,  they  would 
give  suitable  attention,  before  they  should  come  to  a 
final  decision  on  this  point.  I  thought  it  my  duty  to 
suggest  them,  that  they  might  not  be  overlooked.  The 
subject  was  viewed  by  my  countrymen,  as  highly  im 
portant,  and  I  was  anxious  to  omit  no  effort,  which 
might,  possibly,  have  an  influence  in  promoting  friendly 
sentiments,  between  the  two  nations,  or  in  guarding 
against  the  excitement  of  others.  These  fisheries 
afforded  the  means  of  subsistence,  to  multitudes,  of 
people,  who  were  destitute  of  any  other.  They  also 
&ffarded  the  means  of  remittance  to  Great  Britain, 
in  payment  FOR  ARTICLES  OF  HER  MANUFACTURES, 
EXPORTED  TO  AMERICA.  It  was  well  understood  to 
be  the  policy  of  Great  Britain,  that  no  unnecessary 
stimulus,  should  be  given  to  the  manufactures  of  the 
United  States,  which  would  diminish  the  importation 
from  those  of  Great  Britain.  But  by  depriving  the 
fishermen  of  the  United  States,  of  this  source  of  subsis* 
temce>  the  result  must  be,  to  throw  them  back  upon  the 
tmmtry,  and  drive  them  to  resort  to  manufacturing 
for  themselves,  while  on  the  other  hand,  it  would  cut 
off  the  means  of  making  remittances  in  payment  for 
the  manufactures  of  Great  Britain" 

Mr.  Adams,  also  urged  upon  the  British  minister, 
considerations  of  humanity,  such  as  the  multiplication  of 
the  means  of  subsistence  by  the  fisheries,  and  adverted 
to  the  indulgence  granted  to  the  Dutch,  who  were  per- 
mitted  even  in  a  time  of  war,  to  fish  upon  the  coasts  of 
the  island  of  Great  Britain,  and  inferring  from  the 


interdiction  of  fishing  to  the  Americans,  on  the  British 
American  shores,  "  an  indication  of  animosity,  tran 
scending  even  the  ordinary  course  of  hostility  in  war." 
Lord  Bathurst,  denied  that  any  such  disposition  existed 
on  the  part  of  the  British  government. — That  instruc 
tions  had  been  issued  to  the  officers  on  the  Ameri 
can  station,  not  even  to  interrupt  the  American  fish 
ermen,  who  might  have  proceeded  to  the  coasts, 
within  the  British  jurisdiction  for  that  year,  but  to 
allow  them  to  complete  their  fares,  but  to  give  them 
notice  that  the  privilege  could  not  be  extended  beyond 
the  year,  and  that  they  must  not  return  the  next  year. 
Mr.  Adams,  supposed  Lord  Bathurst  more  anxious  to 
prevent  the  Americans  from  curing  their  fish  on  the 
British  territory,  than  from  taking  them  in  the  British 
waters,  and  accounts  for  his  anxiety  on  the  supposition  that 
the  ministry  knew  "  that  the  immediate  curing  and  dry 
ing  of  the  fish,  as  soon  as  they  were  taken,  was  essential  to 
the  value,  if  not  to  the  very  prosecution  of  the  fishery." 
Lord  Bathurst,  however,  alleged  the  ground  of  his 
anxiety,  to  be  the  frequent  disturbances  between  the 
fishermen  of  the  two  nations. 

A  few  days  after  this  conversation,  between  Lord 
Bathurst  and  Mr.  Adams,  the  latter  sent  his  contem 
plated  letter  to  the  former.  He  however  brings  for 
ward  no  new  arguments.  He  again  takes  his  old  ground, 
urges  the  indefeasible  right  of  the  Americans  to  this 
privilege,  because  they  had  always  enjoyed  it,  because 
the  character  of  the  Treaty  of  1783,  gave  it  such  a 
quality  of  perpetuity,  that  it  could  not  be  dissolved  or 
abrogated  by  war;  and  that  the  right  to  fish  rested 
on  the  same  basis  as  the  national  independence  ;  and 
therefore  the  omission  of  a  Treaty  stipulation,  to  con 
tinue  that  right,  could  not  affect  the  question,  notwith 
standing  the  notice  ;  and  that  Great  Britain,  by  her  nom 
inal  grant  in  the  treaty  of  1783,  only  acknowledged  a 
pre-existing  right,  &c. 

He  then,  on  the  part  of  the  fishermen,  appeals  to  the 
humanity,  cupidity  and   interest  of  Great  Britain,  by 
representing  that  the  labours  of  the  fishermen  "  had  the 
2 


10 

ultimate  yesult  of  pouring  into  her  cup  a  great  portion 
of  their  hardy  and  laborious  industry,  that  these  fish 
eries  afforded  the  means  of  subsistence  to  a  numerous 
class  of  people  in  the  United  States,  whose  habits  of 
life  had  been  fashioned  to  no  other  occupation,  and 
whose  fortunes  had  allotted  them  no  other  possession. 
That  to  another,  and,  perhaps  equally  numerous  class 
of  our  citizens,  they  afforded  the  means  of  remittance 
and  payment  for  the  productions  of  British  industry 
and  ingenuity,  imported  from  the  manufactures  of 
the  United  Kingdom.  He  then  urged  the  usefulness 
of  the  labours  of  the  fishermen,  and  the  custom  which 
spared  them  in  times  of  hostility.  That  although  the 
interest  of  the  American  and  British  fishermen  might 
at  times  conflict,  yet  the  labour  of  the  first,  "  might 
produce  advantages  to  other  British  interests,  equally 
entitled  to  the  regard,  and  fostering  care  of  their 
sovereign. 

On  the  8th  of  November,  Mr.  Adams  transmitted  to 
Mr.  M  nroe,  Lord  Bathurst's  reply,  dated  October  30. 

The  British  minister,  after  protesting  against  the 
claim,  observes  in  behalf  of  the  ministry,  i(  that  they 
feel  every  disposition,  to  afford  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  all  the  liberties  and  privileges,  connected 
with  the  fisheries,  which  can  consist  with  the  just  rights 
and  interests  of  Great  Britain,  and  secure  his  majesty's 
subjects  from  the  undue  molestations  in  their  fishery, 
which  they  have  formerly  experienced  from  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States."  He  then  forcibly  controverts 
the  doctrine  of  the  eternal  duration  of  the  right,  in  the 
Americans,  to  enjoy  the  fishing  privileges,  within  the 
limits  of  the  British  sovereignty.  "  If  (says  he)  the 
United  States  derived  from  the  Treaty,  of  1783,  privi 
leges  from  which  other  independent  nations,  not  admit 
ted  by  treaty,  were  excluded,  the  duration  of  the 
privileges  must  depend  upon  the  duration  of  the  instru 
ment,  by  which  they  were  granted,  and  if  the  war 
abrogated  the  treaty,  it  determined  the'privileges.  It 
has  been  urged  indeed  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
that  the  treaty  of  1783,  was  of  a  peculiar  character,  and 


11 

that  because  it  contained  a  recognition  of  American 
independence,  it  could  not  be  abrogated  by  a  subsequent 
war  between  the  parties.  To  a  position  of  this  novel 
nature,  Great  Britain  cannot  accede.  She  knows  of 
no  exception  to  the  rule,  that  all  treaties  are  put  an 
end  to,  by  a  subsequent  war  between  the  same  parties  ; 
she  cannot,  therefore,  consent  to  give  her  diplomatic 
relations  with  one  state,  a  different  degree  of  perma 
nency,  from  that  on  which  her  connection  with  all 
other  states  depends.  Nor  can  she  consider  any  one 
state  at  liberty,  to  assign  to  a  treaty  made  with  her, 
such  a  peculiarity  of  character,  as  shall  make  it,  as  to 
duration,  an  exception  to  all  other  treaties,  in  order  to 
found,  on  a  peculiarity  thus  assumed,  an  irrevocable 
title  to  all  indulgencies,  which  have  all  the  features  of 
temporary  concessions. " 

He  then  asks  what  necessary  connection  there  could 
be,  between  a  right  to  independence,  and  a  liberty  to 
fish.  "Liberties  within  British  limits,  are  as  capable 
of  being  exercised  by  a  dependent,  as  by  an  indepen 
dent  state,  and  cannot  therefore  be  the  necessary  conse 
quence  of  independence."  That  the  right  of  America 
to  independence,  could  not  be  affected,  by  considering 
the  treaty  of  1783,  as  abrogated  by  the  war,  the  right 
was  not  granted  by  the  treaty,  but  only  acknowledged  ; 
were  it  not  so,  Great  Britain  had  renewed  her  ac 
knowledgment  of  independence,  by  her  declaration  of 
war,  in  1812. 

After  controverting  the  doctrine  of  Mr-  Adams,  that 
the  right  existed  previous  to  the  treaty  of  1783,  he 
says,  "  that  though  Great  Britain  could  never  admit  the 
claim  of  the  United  States  to  enjoy  those  liberties,  with 
respect  to  the  fisheries,  as  matter  of  right,  she  was  by 
no  means  insensible  to  some  of  the  considerations  in 
the  letter  of  the  American  minister.  And  although  he 
could  not  consider  the  American  claim  analogous  to  the 
indulgence  granted  to  enemies'  subjects,  to  fish  on  the 
high  seas,  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  fresh  fish  to 
market :  Yet,  says  he,  (speaking  of  the  British  nation) 
"  They  do  feel  that  the  enjoyment  of  the  liberties,  for- 


12 

inerly  used  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States, 
may  be  very  conducive  to  their  national  and  individual 
prosperity,  though  they  should  be  placed  under  some 
modification  ;  and  this  feeling  operated  most  forcibly 
in  favour  of  concession. 

He  then  complains  of  the  pre-occupation  of  the 
British  waters,  by  the  American  fishermen,  and  the 
introduction  of  prohibited  goods  into  the  British  territo 
ries,  from  American  vessels,  to  the  injury  of  the  reve 
nue,  and  concludes  by  professing  that  the  British  gov 
ernment,  were  willing  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  the 
modified  renewal  of  the  liberties. 

"  On  the  8th  of  November,  Mr.  Adams  informs  his 
government  of  this  offer  to  negotiate,  and  by  a  despatch 
from  Secretary  Monroe,  dated  February  27,  1816,  he 
is  authorized  to  commence  the  negotiation. 

Mr.  Monroe,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  dated  May 
24,  1816,  expresses  a  hope  that  the  negotiation  re 
specting  the  fisheries,  might  have  been  concluded. 

From  another  letter,  dated  on  the  8th  of  July  follow 
ing,  it  appears,  that  Mr.  Bagot  was  authorized  to  con 
clude  the  negotiation  at  Washington. 

An  order  had  been  issued,  by  the  British  govern 
ment  to  Admiral  Griffith,  commanding  on  the  American 
station,  to  remove  the  American  fishing  vessels  from 
the  British  waters,  which  order  however  was  revoked, 
during  the  pendency  of  the  negotiation,  upon  the  appli 
cation  of  Mr.  Bagot. 

Mr.  Bagot  and  Mr.  Monroe  proceeded  in  the  nego 
tiation.  Mr.  Bagot  disclaimed  in  the  most  absolute  and 
positive  terms  all  claim  which  was  founded  on  any  sup 
posed  right  on  the  part  of  America,  and  represented 
his  offer  as  arising  solely  from  a  feeling  both  friendly 
and  humane  on  the  part  of  the  British  nation.  He  offer 
ed  the  continuance  of  the  right  to  fish  on  that  part  of 
the  coast  of  Labrador  which  commences  at  Mount  Joli 
to  the  Bay  of  Esquimeaux,  and  to  be  confined  to  the 
unsettled  parts  of  that  coast  in  the  curing  and  drying  of 
their  fish.  That  offer  was  rejected  by  the  American 
government.  Mr.  Bagot  then  offered  that  part  of  the 


13 

southern  coast  of  Newfoundland  which  extends  from 
Cape  Hay  eastward  to  the  Ramean  Islands. 

On  the  30th  of  December,  1816,  Mr.  Monroe  inform 
ed  Mr.  Bagot,  that  his  last  offer  was  rejected,  and  says, 
"  I  have  made  every  inquiry  that  circumstances  have 
permitted  respecting  both  these  coasts,  and  find  that 
neither  would  afford  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
the  essential  accommodation  which  is  desired — neither 
having  been  much  frequented  by  them  heretofore,  or 
likely  to  be  in  future  " 

On  the  next  day,  Mr.  Bagot  after  representing  the 
anxious  desire  of  the  Prince  Regent  to  accommodate 
the  Americans,  offers  both  portions  of  coast. 

Mr.  Monroe  informed  him  on  the  7th  January,  (1817) 
that  his  last  offer  was  also  rejected,  and  says,  that  those 
coasts,  when  taken  conjointly,  would  not  afford  the  ac 
commodation  so  important  to  the  fishermen,  and  repeat 
ed  that  neither  had  been  much  frequented  by  American 
fishermen  or  were  likely  to  be. 

In  a  letter  dated  February  5th,  1817,  Mr.  Monroe 
informs  Mr.  Adams,  of  the  failure  of  the  last  attempt  to 
negotiate,  and  requests  him  to  obtain  an  order  "  to  the 
naval  officer  commanding  on  that  station  not  to  inter 
rupt  or  disturb  our  fishermen  during  the  approaching 
season/'  and  stating  it  also  to  be  the  intention  of  the 
President  to  renew  the  negotiation. 

On  the  21st  of  April,  Mr.  Adams  made  the  applica 
tion  in  pursuance  of  the  request  of  Mr.  Monroe.  On 
the  7th  of  Ma\,  Lord  Castlereagh  replied,  that  as  soon 
as  the  last  offer  of  Mr.  Bagot  was  rejected,  the  British 
Admiral  commanding  at  Halifax  was  notified,  that  the 
orders,  which  were  suspended  by  Mr.  Bagot,  were  re 
newed;  he  then  says,  "  the  British  government  cannot 
but  feel  some  reluctance  again  to  suspend  them,  with 
out  being  in  possession  of  more  precise  grounds  for 
expecting  an  adjustment ;  but  the  Prince  Regent  in 
the  hope  of  an  amicable  settlement,  was  induced  to  yield 
to  the  application,"  and  to  suspend  the  execution  of  the 
orders  during  the  approaching  season. 


14 

On  the  4th  of  August,  1817,  Mr.  Rush  (who  had 
assumed  the  Department  of  State  upon  the  accession  of 
Mr.  Monroe  to  the  Presidency,)  addressed  a  letter  to 
Mr.  Bagot,  stating,  that  at  the  commencement  of  the 
fishing  season,  twenty  sail  of  fishing  vessels  on  their 
outward  voyage  were  compelled  by  a  storm  to  put  into 
a  harbour,  on  the  British  coast,  that  ivhile  there,  they 
were  boarded  by  an  officer  of  the  customs,  who  demand 
ed  and  received  light  money  from  them : — that  after 
completing  their  fares  of  fish,  they  commenced  their 
return  to  the  United  States  : — that  they  were  compelled 
by  another  storm  to  take  shelter  in  another  British 
port : — that  in  this  port  they  were  captured  by  a  barge 
from  the  British  sloop  of  war  Dee,  Capt.  Chambers, 
and  ordered  for  Halifax  ivhere  they  arrived  on  the  9th 
of  June.  That  the  unfortunate  crews  had  been  ex 
posed  to  peculiar  inconveniences  and  hardships  ;  and 
that  those  who  desired  to  return  to  their  homes  were 
refused  passports.  Mr.  Rush  denied  that  these  vessels 
had  been  fishing  in  British  waters. 

Mr.  Bagot  enclosed  to  Mr.  Rush  a  copy  of  the  orders 
of  Admiral  Sir  David  Milne,  commanding  on  the  North 
American  station,  to  the  captain  of  the  Dee,  directing 
him  to  capture  all  vessels  fishing,  or  at  anchor  within 
the  maritime  jurisdiction  of  Great  Britain,  and  to  send 
them  to  Halifax  for  adjudication,  exempting,  however, 
vessels  which  should  clearly  appear  to  have  been  obliged 
to  put  into  British  ports  in  consequence  of  distress. 

The  captain  of  the  Dee,  in  his  despatch  to  the  Ad 
miral,  dated  the  8th  of  June,  states  that  he  was  inform 
ed  that  the  whole  of  the  banks  westward  (offCape  Sable 
and  Shelburne)  were  fished  by  American  schooners,  and 
that  they  continually  resorted  to  the  creeks  on  the  coast, 
to  catch  their  bait,  clean  their  fish,  and  to  procure  wood, 
water,  &c.  which  was  highly  detrimental  to  the  indus 
trious  fishermen  living  on  the  coast,  &c.  That  he  re 
ceived  information  that  nine  American  vessels  had  been 
found  at  Ragged  Island  harbour  laying  with  their  nets  set. 
Lieut.  Hooper  remained  there  and  despatched  Lieut. 
Lechenere,  to  Cape  Negro,  where  he  found  two  vessels 


15 

in  the  harbour,  and  seven  others  came  in,  the  whole 
joined  him  with  two  others  which  came  into  Ragged 
Island,  and  that  he  had  sent  them  into  Halifax  for  adju 
dication.  He  said,  that  had  they  been  in  distress  they 
might  have  been  relieved  with  more  ease  at  the  regular 
harbour  of  Shelburne,  than  at  the  two  intricate  harbours 
iu  its  neighbourhood.  He  further  says,  ".  that,  without 
the  use  of  our  harbours,  it  appears  impossible  for  any 
foreigners  to  carry  on  successful  fishing  on  this  coast.7' 

In  the  year  1818,  Mr.  Gallatin  and  Mr.  Rush  were 
empowered  to  negotiate  a  new  commercial  treaty  with 
Great  Britain,  and  Mr.  Adams  specially  instructed  them 
respecting  the  fisheries.  In  his  despatch  of  July  28, 
1818,  he  says,  "  The  President  authorizes  you  to  agree 
to  an  article,  whereby  the  United  States  will  desist 
from  the  liberty  of  fishing,  and  curing,  and  drying 
fish  within  the  British  jurisdiction  generally ,  upon 
condition  that  it  shall  be  secured  as  a  permanent  right, 
not  liable  to  be  impaired  by  any  future  war,  from 
Cape  Ray  to  the  Ramean  Islands,  and  from  Mount- 
Joli  on  the  Labrador  coast,  through  the  strait  of 
Belle  Isle,  indefinitely  north,  along  the  coast:  the  right 
to  extend  as  well  to  the  curing  and  drying  the  fish,  as 
to  fishing." 

Mr.  Adams  then  adverts  to  the  trial  of  the  above- 
named  American  vessels  at  Halifax,  in  whose  favour 
a  decree  had  been  obtained  from  the  Vice  Admiralty 
Court,  on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  act  of  Parlia 
ment  which  authorized  the  condemnation  of  vessels  for  a 
violation  of  territorial  jurisdiction,  but  on  the  question 
of  the  right  of  the  Americans  to  fish  under  the  treaty  of 
1783.  Judge  Wallace  who  presided  was  clearly  of  the 
opinion,  that  the  war  dissolved  that  treaty.  The  cap 
tors  appealed  from  the  decree  to  London,  and  Mr. 
Adams,  instructed  Mr.  Rush  to  obtain  the  best  counsel 
to  argue  the  question  of  right  before  the  Lords  of  ap 
peals,  asserting  that  the  rights  in  question  were  not  ac 
quired  by  the  treaty  of  1783,  but  having  been  always 
enjoyed  before,  were  only  recognised  by  that  treaty. 
He  concluded  this  branch  of  his  instructions  by  saying. 


16 

"  The  British  government  may  be  well  assured  that  not 
a  particle  of  these  rights  will  be  finally  yielded  by  the 
United  States,  without  a  struggle,  which  will  cost 
Great  Britain  more  than  the  worth  of  the  prize. 

It  is  needless  to  recount  the  various  propositions  re 
specting  the  fisheries  which  were  offered  by  the  differ 
ent  parties,  at  the  negotiation  which  terminated  in  the 
Convention  of  October,  1818.  The  result  was,  the  in 
sertion  of  this  article  in  the  convention  which  is  the 
first. 

"  Whereas  differences  have  arisen  respecting  the 
liberty  claimed  by  the  United  States  for  the  inhabitants 
thereof,  to  take,  dry,  and  cure  fish  on  certain  coasts, 
bays,  harbours  and  creeks  of  his  Britannic  Majesty's 
dominions  in  America,  it  is  agreed  between  the  high 
contracting  parties,  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  said 
United  States  shall  have,  forever  in  common  with  the 
subjects  of  his  Britannic  Majesty,  the  liberty  to  take 
fish  of  every  kind  on  that  part  of  the  southern  coast  of 
Newfoundland  which  extends  from  Cape  Ray  to  the  Ra- 
mean  Islands,  on  the  western  and  northern  coast  of  New 
foundland  from  the  said  Cape  Ray  to  the  Quipon  Islands, 
on  the  shores  of  the  Magdalen  Islands,  and  also  on  the 
coasts,  bays,  harbours  and  creeks  from  Mount  Joli,  on 
the  southern  coast  of  Labrador,  to  and  through  the 
straits  of  Belle  Isle,  and  thence  northwardly,  inde 
finitely,  along  the  coast;  without  prejudice,  however, 
to  any  of  the  exclusive  rights  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Com 
pany  :  and  that  the  American  fishermen  shall  also  have 
liberty,  forever,  to  dry  and  cure  fish  in  any  of  the  un 
settled  bays,  harbours,  and  creeks  of  the  southern  part 
of  the  coast  of  Newfoundland,  hereabove  described,  and 
of  the  coast  of  Labrador ;  but  so  soon  as  the  same  or 
any  portion  thereof,  shall  be  settled,  it  shall  not  be  law 
ful  for  the  said  fishermen  to  dry  or  cure  fish  at  such 
portion  so  settled,  without  previous  agreement  for  such 
purpose,  with  the  inhabitants,  proprietors,  or  possessors, 
of  the  ground.  dnd  the  United  States  hereby  re 
nounce,  forever,  any  liberty  heretofore  enjoyed  or 
claimed  by  the,  inhabitants  thereof,  to  take,  dry,  or  cure 


17 

Jish9  on  or  within  three  marine  miles  of  any  of  the 
coasts,  bays,  creeks,  or  harbours  of  his  Britannic  Majes 
ty's  dominions  in  America,  not  included  in  the  above 
-mentioned  limits:  Provided,  however,  that  the  Ame 
rican  fishermen  shall  be  admitted  to  enter  such  bays  or 
harbours,  for  the  purpose  of  shelter  and  of  repairing 
damage  therein,  of  purchasing  wood,  and  of  obtaining 
water,  and  for  no  other  purpose  whatever.  But  they 
shall  be  under  such  restrictions  as  may  be  necessary  to 
prevent  their  taking,  drying,  or  curing,  fish  therein,  or 
in  any  other  manner  whatever  abusing  the  privileges 
hereby  reserved  to  them." 

At  the  close  of  the  despatch  in  which  Mr.  Rush  com 
municates  the  news  of  the  signing  of  the  convention  to 
Mr.  Adams,  he  says,  "  From  the  instructions  of  the 
28th  of  July,  I  infer  that  government  contemplated 
becoming  instrumental  to  the  solemn  argument  of  the 
great  question  of  right,  under  the  treaty  of  ?b3  only 
in  the  event  of  no  article  respecting  the  fisheries  being 
agreed  upon ;  and  then  states  his  supposition  that  the 
signing  of  the  treaty  precluded  the  necessity  of  this 
course — he  further  says,  "  I  mention  this,  perceiving 
from  the  newspapers,  that  there  have  been  fresh  cap 
tures  of  our  fishing  vessels  during  the  last  season,  fol 
lowed  by  sentences  of  condemnation,  from  which  ap 
peals,  on  the  part  of  the  claimants,  may,  I  take  it  for 
granted  be  anticipated." 

Such  was  "  the  most  lame  and  impotent  conclusion" 
of  the  celebrated  negotiation  respecting  the  fisheries. 
This  subject  may  be  viewed  in  a  variety  of  lights. 

Admit  the  doctrines  assumed  by  Mr.  Adams,  to  have 
been  correct,  and  his  argument  on  the  question  of  right 
to  have  been  incontrovertible,  was  it  wise  to  leave  a 
question  of  such  vital  importance  as  he  chose  to  consider 
this,  unsettled  ? 

When  the  British  government  had  explicitly  avowed 
their  sentiments  in  a  formal  communication,  when  he 
had  a  full  knowledge  of  their  views,  was  it  wise  in  him 
to  sign  a  treaty  of  peace,  leaving  this  most  important 
national  interest  insecure,  and  a  right  as  sacred  as  the 
3 


18 

right  to  independence,  subject  to  violation  on  the  day 
of  its  ratification  ? 

Could  any  reasonable  man  have  believed  that  after 
this  formal  avowal  by  the  British  government  of  their 
intentions,  and  after  their  solemn  denial  of  our  right, 
they  would  leave  such  of  our  fishermen  as  they  should 
discover  in  their  waters  unmolested? 

Was  it  not  morally  certain  that  the  British  nation 
would  act  practically  upon  this  determination  of  their 
government,  and  would  (should  it  become  necessary) 
resort  to  force  to  exclude  the  Americans  from  their  ter 
ritorial  jurisdiction  ? 

But  says  Mr.  Adams,  if  the  Americans  were  notified 
by  the  British  that  they  should  not  again  grant  this 
privilege  to  them,  the  British  were  also  notified  by  the 
Americans,  that  they  considered  that  privilege  secured 
by  a  title  which  could  not  be  abrogated  by  war. 

Of  what  practical  consequence  was  the  American  no 
tice  ?  America  claimed  a  right  to  use  a  beneficial  privi 
lege  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  Great  Britain, 
the  existence  of  which,  Great  Britain  denied.  Force 
must  settle  all  controverted  questions  which  cannot  be 
settled  by  negotiation.  Had  an  appeal  been  made  to 
arms,  who  had  the  advantage.  The  British  were  upon 
their  own  shores,  and  within  their  own  waters.  We 
should  have  been  compelled  to  have  sought  the  lion  in 
his  den.  Had  we  armed  our  fishermen  we  should  only 
have  given  an  additional  value  to  the  prizes  of  the 
British  ships  of  war.  The  question  must  eventually 
have  been  settled  by  a  resort  to  open  hostilities,  and 
under  this  peculiar  advantage  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain.  She  could  have  chosen  her  time,  and  might 
and  probably  would  have  chosen  it,  when  our  army  was 
disbanded,  our  navy  dismantled,  our  whole  commerce 
afloat,  and  when  all  the  dear  bought  advantages  of  the 
last  war,  experience,  organization,  discipline,  and  the 
confidence  arising  from  successful  enterprise  might  have 
been  lost. 

The  great  object  of  treaties  of  peace  is  security. 
Truces  or  armistices  may  be  made  for  convenience, 


19 

sometimes  in  the  hope  of  peace,  hut  treaties  of  peace 
settling  no  controverted  principle,  or  disputed  right,  are 
worse  in  their  consequences  than  a  state  of  continued 
hostility.  Nations  who  expect  war  are  inexcusable  if 
they  are  not  prepared  to  meet  them,  and  a  state  of  con 
tinual  preparation  would  produce  all  the  disadvantages 
of  war  and  preclude  the  possible  advantages  of  annoying 
the  enemy,  by  capturing  his  ships  and  conquering  his 
colonies.  Pressed  as  Great  Britain  once  was  with  a 
war  with  the  whole  continent  of  Europe  for  years,  and 
staggering  under  burthens  which  would  have  sunk  the 
Roman  Empire,  (burthens  so  great  that  the  most  saga 
cious  statesmen  of  Europe  predicted  her  inability  to 
maintain  the  contest  for  a  single  year ;)  yet  she  steadi 
ly  refused  to  make  a  peace,  unless  she  could  satisfy  her 
self  that  the  peace  which  she  should  make,  \\ould  be 
secure  and  permanent. 

The  Treaty  of  Ghent  was  ratified  by  the  American 
Government  in  the  latter  part  of  February,  1815,  and 
the  exchange  of  ratifications  took  place  some  time  after. 
On  the  21st  of  the  following  July,  Mr.  Monroe  was 
apprehensive  that  hostilities  would  be  renewed,  and  in 
formed  Mr.  Adams  of  his  apprehensions,  and  this  opin 
ion  was  founded  on  previous  acts  committed  by  the  Brit 
ish  ?  although  the  British  government  disavowed  the 
act  of  the  Captain  of  the  Jaseur,  yet  she  maintained  a 
principle  which  both  Mr.  Monroe  and  Mr.  Adams  con 
sidered  as  indicative  of  a  spirit  equally  hostile. 

Mr.  Adams  in  his  despatch  to  Mr.  Monroe  of  the 
19th  of  September  following,  expresses  his  own  appre 
hensions  that  Great  Britain  was  determined  to  renew 
hostilities. 

Orders  were  issued  to  the  British  naval  commanders 
in  the  first  instance,  to  warn  off,  and  then,  to  capture 
our  fishing  vessels  :  these  orders,  it  is  true  were  occasion 
ally  suspended,  but  they  were  occasionally  enforced, 
and  many  American  vessels  were  captured  which  were 
only  saved  from  condemnation  in  the  Vice-Admiralty 
Court  because  there  was  no  specific  act  of  Parliament 
providing  for  such  condemnation,  and  upon  the  last  sup- 


20 

plicating  application  to  the  British  government  for  a 
further  suspension  of  these  orders,  there  was  an  evident 
reluctance  to  yield  this  indulgence. 

Had  not  the  American  government  abandoned  the 
ground  which  Mr.  Adams  assumed,  a  new  war  would 
inevitably  have  occurred,  and  nothing  would  have  been 
gained  by  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  but  a  respite,  during 
which,  our  ability  to  maintain  a  war  would  have  been 
lessened,  and  the  spirit  of  the  people  which  was  flowing 
brightly  from  the  excitement  of  otir  successes  on  the  ocean, 
and  the  mighty  victory  at  New  Orleans  would  have  slum 
bered  in  indifference.  The  cause  of  war  would  have 
been  narrowed  to  a  single  point.  The  right  for  which 
we  contended  would  have  been  considered  as  the  exclu 
sive  interest  of  Massachusetts,  and  to  say  the  most  of  it, 
of  a  questionable  character. 

A  statesman,  a  suckling  statesman  could  not  have 
committed  a  greater  mistake  than  to  pledge  the  national 
honour  on  the  question  of  the  fishing  right,  and  then  to 
sign  a  Treaty  with  a  full  understanding  that  the  right 
would  not  be  admitted,  he  having  the  germs  of  war  in  the 
very  instrument  of  pacification,  and  on  a  point  about 
which  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  make  the  people 
believe  that  the  general  interest  was  involved. 

If  this  right  stood  as  unshaken  as  it  did  before  the 
last  war,  "  constituting  a  vital  part  of  our  political 
existence,  and  resting  on  the  same  solid  foundation  as 
our  Independence  itself,"  was  it  worthy  of  the  dignity 
of  the  American  nation  to  beg  for  it,  or  to  carry  it  into 
the  market  for  the  purposes  of  traffic,  by  holding  out  con 
siderations  of  interest  as  the  bonus  for  which  it  was  to 
be  regranted.  If  the  right  was  of  this  lofty  character 
it  was  enough.  A  right  of  this  character  rested  on  its 
own  basis  and  required  no  props  to  sustain  it.  If  the 
alternative  was  its  surrender,  or  war,  not  an  American 
could  hesitate  in  his  choice,  if  he  viewed  the  subject  in 
the  same  light  with  Mr.  Adams  :  under  such  circum 
stances  it  was  a  national  degradation  to  appeal  to  British 
humanity  for  the  permission  to  use  an  unquestionable  right 
"  by  representing  it  as  affording  the  means  of  subsistence 
to  multitudes;  who  without  it  would  be  destitute." 


21 

Still  more  humiliating  was  it  to  appeal  to  British  cu 
pidity  by  representing  that  on  the  exercise  of  this  right 
the  Americans  depended  for  the  means  "  to  make  their 
remittances  to  pay  for  the  manufactured  goods  of 
Great  Britain"  and  to  hint  that  it  would  he  to  the  ad 
vantage  of  a  great  British  interest  that  no  unnecessary 
stimulus  should  be  given  to  the  growth  of  American 
manufactures,  thus  holding  out  to  the  British  nation  a 
virtual  pledge  that  the  American  government  would  aid 
in  no  protecting  system  for  the  benefit  of  domestic 
manufactures  provided  the  Fisheries  were  regranted  ! 

In  what  a  wretched  situation  is  that  negotiator  placed 
who  after  assuming  the  loftiest  pretensions  about  an  un 
questionable  right,  will  condescend  to  traffic  for  that 
right  by  holding  out  inducements  for  its  purchase ;  we 
have  often  been  called  a  trading  nation,  and  surely  with 
justice,  if  an  American  minister  will  undertake  to  trade 
away  our  independence  !  and  to  lay  the  nation  under  a 
perpetual  bond  to  purchase  British  broadcloths,  and 
calicoes,  and  laces,  and  linens. 

Mr.  Adams  had  the  further  mortification  to  hear  from 
a  British  minister  that  he  was  not  insensible  to  some  of  the 
considerations  which  had  been  offered,  and  that  although 
there  was  not  the  slightest  foundation  for  the  American 
claim  on  the  ground  of  right,  yet  that  the  ministry  felt 
that  the  enjoyment  of  "  the  liberties  formerly  used  by 
the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States  might  be  very  condu 
cive  to  their  national  and  individual  prosperity  though 
they  should  be  placed  under  some  modifications  ;  and 
that  the  feeling  operated  most  forcibly  in  favour  of  con 
cession."  He  had  the  mortification  to  hear  that  this  im 
portant  interest,  which  was  lost  to  the  American  people 
from  his  stubborn  adherence  to  a  false  principle,  might 
be  regained,  because  a  British  ministry  felt  for  the  dis 
tresses  of  American  fishermen  !  And  from  motives  of 
humanity  alone  (the  British  say)  they  regranted  to  us 
by  the  Convention  of  October,  1818,  a  fragment  of  that 
magnificent  privilege,  which  we  had  so  long  enjoyed, 
and  to  the  unrestricted  use  of  which,  we  might  unques 
tionably  attribute  a  large  share  of  our  national  wealth. 


If  the  privilege  was  of  the  character  which  Mr. 
Adams  assumed  it  to  be,  what  right  had  the  American 
government  to  give  up  a  part,  or  even  the  slightest  part. 
The  right  existed  entire,  or  it  did  not  exist : — if  it 
existed  entire,  its  surrender  is  a  wrong  done  to  the  na 
tion  for  which  the  government  are  answerable,  inasmuch 
as  they  renounced  the  right  to  more  than  three  quar 
ters  of  this  privilege,  if  the  estimate  be  made  upon 
length  of  coast,  and  a  greater  proportion  if  its  value  be 
estimated  from  the  facility  in  taking,  curing  and  drying 
the  fish,  and  the  safety  of  navigating. 

On  questions  of  national  law  and  the  construction  of 
Treaties,  I  do  not  profess  to  have  as  much  learning  as 
even  Col.  Pickering,  Gen.  Washington's  Secretary  of 
State,  who  President  Adams  tells  us  was  not  qualified 
for  a  higher  station  than  that  of  a  collector  of  the  cus 
toms,  but  I  have  reflected  somewhat,  upon  the  argument 
of  Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams  as  to  the  permanency  of  the 
American  right  of  fishery.  If  I  have  penetration  enough 
to  understand  his  argument  he  founds  the  right, 

First,  on  the  perpetual  possession. 

Secondly,  on  the  Treaty  of  1783,  which  treaty  he 
contends  was  not  abrogated  by  the  last  war. 

A  general  has  sometimes  been  defeated  from  spreading 
his  force  over  too  much  ground,  sometimes,  when  he 
might  successfully  have  defended  one  position  by  under 
taking  to  defend  more,  and  sometimes  by  an  injudicious 
choice  of  positions. 

If  perpetual  possession  gave  us  the  right,  it  was  not 
derived  from  the  Treaty  of  1783,  the  title  would  have 
heen  good  without  the  Treaty. 

If  the  title  was  derived  from  the  treaty  of  1783  then 
there  was  either  no  prior  title,  or  if  there  was,  it  must 
have  been  merged  in  the  title  acquired  from  the  Treaty. 

It  is  to  be  understood  that  none  of  the  reasoning  in 
this  discussion  is  applicable  to  the  right  of  fishing  on  the 
high  seas,  that  right  is  common  to  all  independent  na 
tions,  unless  restricted  by  treaty  stipulations ;  that  right 
Great  Britain  never  denied  to  be  ours;  but  it  is  to  be 
applied  to  the  right  of  using  the  fishery  within  the  terri- 


23 

torial  domain  of  Great  Britain,  (which  domain  all 
civilians  define  to  be  an  absolute  right  of  soil,  and  of 
water  within  a  marine  league  from  the  shore.) 

If  our  title  be  derived  from  possession  when  did  that 
possession  commence  ?  Did  it  commence  on  the  day  of 
the  settlement  of  Jamestown,  or  Plymouth  ;  of  the  cap 
ture  of  Louisbourgh  ;  of  the  surrender  of  the  French 
provinces  in  North  America  ;  of  the  signing  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  of  1763  ;  of  the  battle  of  Lexington  ; 
of  the  disclaimer  made  by  the  Provincial  Congress  of 
Massachusetts  of  the  authority  of  Gov.  Gage  ;  or  on  the 
day  in  which  the  Declaration  of  Independence  was  sign 
ed  ? 

I  believe  there  are  none  in  America  who  will  say  that 
this  nation  was  independent  of  the  British  crown  before 
the  4th  day  of  July,  1776,  except  it  be  Mr.  John  Quincy 
Adams  and  his  venerable  father ;  if  the  arguments  and 
the  opinions  of  the  son  are  to  be  believed,  America  never 
was  subject  to  the  British  crown,  and  the  father  says 
that  he  declared  America  to  be  independent  twenty-one 
years  previous  to  the  signing  of  the  immortal  declaration. 
What  kind  of  independence  was  meant  I  am  unable  to 
say.  It  is  certain  that  in  all  the  provinces  except  Rhode 
Island  and  Connecticut,  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  the 
Governors  held  their  appointments  from  the  crown,  and 
subject  to  the  pleasure  of  the  king,  and  all  the  provincial 
officers  received  their  appointments  from  the  Governors. 
Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut  claimed  no  inherent  civil 
rights  but  derived  them  from  the  charters  of  Charles  II. 
The  modern  doctrine  of  the  rights  of  man,  so  zealously 
attacked  by  the  younger  Adams,  was  not  then  under 
stood.  In  the  proprietary  governments  the  proprietors 
held  by  grant  from  the  crown,  and  subject  to  the  crown. 

If  my  recollection  serves  me,  the  elder  Adams  called 
himself  a  true  and  loyal  subject  of  the  king  of  Great 
Britain  in  the  autumn  of  1774,  and  all  the  other  mem 
bers  of  the  first  Congress.  The  Americans  who  resisted 
the  king's  troops  at  Lexington  never  dreamed  that  they 
were  not  subjects  of  the  king,  the  Provincial  Congress 
never  disclaimed  the  king  but  only  the  king's  Governor, 


24 

and  to  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  independence  pro 
fessed  to  resist  not  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  but  the 
unconstitutional  acts  of  the  Parliament  of  Great  Britain. 
To  that  day  the  right  of  fishing  was  a  right  enjoyed  by 
us  in  common  with  all  the  subjects  of  the  British  crown. 
It  was  a  right  not  derived  from  our  independence  of  the 
crown,  but  from  our  dependence  on  it.  Our  right  then 
from  possession  must  have  accrued  between  the  4th  day 
of  July,  1776,  and  the  Treaty  of  Peace  in  Nov.  1783. 

Will  any  man  pretend  that  during  that  period  we  ever 
had  the  shadow  of  possession  ?  I  do  not  hazard  much  in 
saying  that  no  fishermen  of  the  States  dropped  their 
lines  in  British  waters  or  cured  their  fish  on  British  soil 
subsequent  to  the  4th  of  July,  1776,  and  anterior  to  Nov. 
1783.  If  any  did,  it  was  in  them  an  act  of  singular 
temerity,  inasmuch  as  the  British  navy  covered  the  seas 
of  North  America,  and  not  only  the  British  provinces  as 
they  now  exist  were  in  the  possession  of  the  crown,  but 
all  that  part  of  the  state  of  Maine  between  Nova  Scotia 
and  the  Penobscot,  with  all  its  bays,  harbours,  inlets  and 
rivers.  During  the  continuance  of  hostilities,  capture 
would  not  only  have  been  probable,  but  almost  certain. 
If  fish  were  taken  upon  the  British  American  coasts 
during  that  period  they  must  have  been  taken  secretly 
and  by  stealth,  and  not  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  us  a 
presumptive  title  from  possession. 

If  the  title  be  placed  on  the  same  ground  with  our 
title  to  independence,  how  is  the  treaty  of  1783  to  be 
construed  ?  The  British  may  say  that  they  by  that 
treaty,  granted  us  independence ;  all  that  we  pretend  to 
say  is,  that  they  then  acknowledged  our  independence  to 
exist,  or  at  the  most  we  contend  that  the  acknowledg 
ment  was  retrospective,  and  no  man  in  his  senses  except 
the  two  gentlemen  I  have  before  named  will  say  that  the 
acknowledgment  extended  to  a  time  anterior  to  the  4th 
of  July,  1776.  It  would  be  strange  indeed  if  it  acknow 
ledged  independence  to  have  existed  previous  to  that 
day,  when,  the  very  men  who  declared  it  had  called 
themselves,  in  an  official  act  not  a  year  anterior  to  the 
declaration,  true  and  loyal  subjects  of  the  crown  of  Great 
Britain  ! 


25 

Had  the  treaty  of  1783  been  silent  on  the  subject  of  the 
fisheries  no  right  would  have  remained  to  America,  but 
after  an  infinite  deal  of  negotiation  a  right  was  obtained 
— full,  ample  and  satisfactory,  giving  to  us  a  privilege 
almost  equal  to  that  of  British  subjects,  and  until  the 
war  of  1812  we  held  that  privilege  by  a  title  as  incon 
testable  as  our  title  to  the  capitol,  yet  the  capitol  was 
taken,  and  it  was  amongst  the  chances  of  possibilities 
that  we  might  have  been  compelled  to  negotiate  for  it. 

The  strong  point  on  which  Mr.  Adams  seems  to  rest 
his  argument  is  the  indestructable  nature  of  the  Treaty 
of  1783.  I  have  ever  supposed  that  a  declaration  of 
war  annihilated  all  subsisting  treaties  between  bellige 
rents.  That  any  rights  appertaining  to  the  indepen 
dence  of  nations  are  abrogated  by  war  I  do  not  contend, 
but  all  rights  derived  from  a  Treaty  are,  and  it  is  very 
easy  to  suppose  that  a  privilege  beneficial  to  one  nation, 
existing  within  the  territorial  domain  of  another  may  be. 
The  right  to  independence  rests  upon  a  different  prin 
ciple,  and  if  it  did  not,  the  act  of  declaring  war,  or  the 
consent  to  negotiate,  is  a  sufficient  acknowledgment  that 
it  exists.  And  it  would  exist  without  a  treaty.  Indi 
viduals  may  be  outlawed,  but  nations  cannot  be,  their 
independence  will  remain  until  they  are  conquered,  and 
even  then  without  a  formal  surrender  by  treaty ;  after 
that,  hostile  resistance  would  be  rebellion,  before  it,  it 
would  be  legitimate  and  justifiable  warfare  : — and  were 
nations  thus  resisting  even  after  every  fortified  post  in 
the  conquered  country  had  been  obtained,  to  violate  the 
rules  of  legitimate  warfare,  they  would  violate  the  laws 
of  nations,  and  all  other  nations  would  be  justified  in 
making  common  cause  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
such  violations. 

But  if  this  privilege  was  unaifected  by  a  declaration 
of  war,  and  remained  in  its  full  force  and  pristine 
strength,  then  the  subjects  of  one  belligerent,  might  of 
right  remain  in  the  heart  of  the  territory  of  the  other 
belligerent,  and  carry  on  their  ordinary  business  with 
out  hindrance  or  molestation.  The  vessels  of  one  might 
be  captured  on  their  own  waters,  and  in  their  own  har- 
4 


26 

hours,  and  the  vessels  of  the  other  might  be  privileged 
from  capture  themselves,  and  for  aught  I  see,  might  aid 
in  the  capture  of  those  of  the  other  power,  because  the 
grant  was  not  mutual,  but  only  existed  on  one  side. 

The  treaty  remained  unimpaired  by  the  declaration 
of  war,  or  it  did  not;  if  it  was  unimpaired,  then  every 
hostile  act  was  wrong  and  illegal,  if  it  was  impaired,  then, 
the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Adams,  as  to  its  indestructibility 
falls  to  the  ground. 

Mr.  Adams  may  choose  to  call  this  the  British  side 
of  the  argument,  but  the  period  has  arrived  when  he 
cannot  play  off  his  catch  words  of  British  influence, 
British  partialities,  British  arguments.  It  needs  not 
a  British  argument  to  shew  that  on  the  suggestion  of 
Mr.  Adams,  an  important  and  invaluable  national  inter 
est  was  exposed  to  total  loss  from  his  misconstruction  of 
a  plain  principle,  a  principle  founded  on  common  reason, 
and  common  sense,  and  which  none  but  a  man  perverse 
ly  obstinate,  and  wilfully  wrong  headed  and  eccentric 
would  undertake  to  deny. 

It  is  in  vain  to  call  in  the  sanction  of  the  other  nego 
tiators.  If  Mr.  Adams  will  claim  the  whole  merit  of 
his  wonderful  discovery  of  a  new  principle,  if  that  prin 
ciple  be  found  upon  investigation  to  be  absurd  and  false, 
resting  on  no  equitable  basis,  and  unsupported  by  any 
custom  or  usage  of  nations,  he  ought  to  be  sufficiently 
magnanimous  to  take  the  blame  of  his  erring  and  eccen 
tric  diplomacy. 

Besides  the  interest  being  exclusively  a  Massachu 
setts  interest,  they  might  reasonably  suppose  that  a 
diplomatist  as  able  and  experienced  as  he  was  expected 
to  have  been,  would  not  have  hazarded  this  great  inter 
est  of  his  own  state,  unless  he  had  examined  the  strength, 
and  tested  the  truth  of  the  principle  on  which  he  meant 
to  place  it.  They  confided  too  much,  and  that  was 
their  error.  It  may  seem  surprising  that  they  should 
have  been  so  deluded,  yet  it  is  not  more  surprising  than 
that  the  people  of  New  England,  intelligent,  shrewd  and 
sagacious  as  they  certainly  are,  especially,  in  all  matters 
touching  their  own  interests,  should  still  continue  to  be- 


27 

lieve  that  it  was  owing  to  the  exertions  of  Mr.  Adams, 
that  the  fisheries  were  saved  !  that  the  man  who  was 
mainly  instrumental  in  the  destruction  of  their  com 
merce,  and  who  holds  the  mercantile  character  in  utter 
contempt,  should  be  its  champion?  that  the  man  who  is 
under  a  virtual  pledge  to  the  government  of  Great 
Britain,  to  lend  no  aid  to  any  system  for  the  protection 
of  domestic  industry,  should  be  the  fast  friend  of  the 
manufacturing  interest?  yet  such  is  the  common  belief 
of  New  England,  a  delusion  as  strange  as  that,  which  is 
said  to  have  prevailed  at  Salem  during  an  early  period 
of  the  colonial  history  of 

MASSACHUSETTS. 


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